

*Secretary Albright*

# The OAS and the Road to Santiago: Building a Hemispheric Community In the Americas

March 5, 1998

*Remarks at the Conference on the Americas, Organization of American States, Washington, DC.*

Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary General. It is a great pleasure to be here. I would also like to say how very pleased I am that the Assistant Secretary General Christopher Thomas is here; the Dean of the OAS Diplomatic Corps, Ambassador Lawrence Chewning; and the President of the Permanent Council, Albert Ramdin. I am very pleased to be here with all of you, Mr. Presidents, Madame Vice Presidents, and Ministers. I am also very glad that my very good friend, Ambassador Marrero, is now our nation's Ambassador to the OAS; Mack McLarty, the President's special envoy for the Americas, and Assistant Secretary of State Jeff Davidow, and distinguished guests.

There is a remarkable assemblage of knowledge and talent gathered in this room, and I'm delighted to be here as representative of the host country to join with you in marking the 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Organization of American States. The OAS is a living example of the determination and foresight of our predecessors. In fact, its roots go back as far as independence itself.

Simon Bolivar wanted the Americas to be measured not by her vast area and wealth, but "by her freedom and her glory." Today, that vision is closer to reality than it has ever been. For as we meet, with one exception, every government in the hemisphere is freely elected; every economy has liberalized its system for investment and trade. For the first time in decades, Central America is wholly at peace, and we see progress toward a nonviolent settlement of the border dispute between Ecuador and Peru.

Moreover, as Latin America and the Caribbean have learned to make peace at home, they have begun to do so abroad. Nations here have been among the leading participants in international peacekeeping operations. They have been in the forefront of efforts to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction. And no

region has been more resolute in insisting that Iraq comply with UN Security Council resolutions and the unfettered inspections and monitoring they require.

Despite all this, huge challenges remain. The greatest of these is to bring the benefits of economic and political freedom to all our citizens, for today, too many in our hemisphere remain, in the words of former President Franklin Roosevelt, "ill-housed, ill-clad, and ill-nourished." Too many remain cut off from the benefits of the new global economy. In a few weeks, at the second Summit of the Americas, in Santiago, our leaders will seek to build on the vision of the true hemispheric community put forward in Miami three years ago.

On that occasion, President Clinton said that the true test of our cooperation would be to turn words into deeds. In the years since, we have worked hard and have much progress to report, including the world's first regional pact against corruption, forged here at the OAS; greatly improved cooperation on counter-narcotics; and new programs to combat disease, promote microenterprise, curb domestic violence, increase energy efficiency, and assist in humanitarian relief.

Education will be a principal focus at the second summit, because of its intrinsic importance and because it is the single best tool for combating poverty and for narrowing the socially destructive divide between rich and poor. In Santiago, leaders will take concrete steps to improve primary and secondary schooling by developing education standards and by making the tools of knowledge—from textbooks to cutting edge technology—more available.

They will also seek to launch negotiations to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas, or the FTAA, by the year 2005. Let me stress that the FTAA remains a keystone of President Clinton's policy of cooperation in this hemi-

sphere. The FTAA would build on the trend embodied in NAFTA, MERCOSUR, and CARICOM, the Andean Pact and the Central American Common Market. This family of regional pacts differs from earlier attempts at integration because it is rooted in market reforms and designed to create jobs and raise living standards through the removal of barriers to investment and trade.

Although the trend toward integration has produced healthier economies than the region has seen in two decades, it has also generated friction. There are critics in my country and, I suspect, in each of yours. Some simply fear the

future and yearn for the past they view through rose-colored glasses. But others demand and deserve a serious response, for they want to know that the benefits of globalization will be shared by the hardworking many, not reserved for the lucky few. They want to be sure that profits will come from perspiration and inspiration, not exploitation of workers or the environment.

Together in Santiago, we should reaffirm our conviction that the path to increased prosperity for the greatest number resides not in a retreat from reform, but in its refinement—in more openness coupled with more accountability and high standards. That is why we will be seeking to negotiate a balanced and comprehensive FTAA that addresses the impact of trade liberalization on labor and the environment in a responsible way.

The discussions in Santiago will also review so-called second generation economic reforms that extend accountability and the rule of law to the financial world, thereby promoting prosperity that is broad-based and less vulnerable to the kinds of disruptions

we see now in East Asia.

We must also maintain our leadership in this hemisphere as advocates and practitioners of sustainable development. In Santiago, we should agree on the next steps to improve water quality, expand the use of renewable energy technologies, and move closer to consensus on global climate change. Democracy will also be

on the agenda in Chile, supported by an increasingly active champion of freedom, the OAS.

Jose Marti once wrote that “the will of all citizens, peacefully expressed, is a source that leads to all true republics.” It is with these words in mind that OAS election observers have helped facilitate difficult political transitions and provided technical advice on the nuts and bolts of building democratic institutions. Concrete OAS measures to promote freedom of the press should be endorsed in Santiago next month. And the Washington Protocol has sent a message heard round the world by making OAS the first regional political body to permit a member’s suspension if its democratic government is overthrown.

Finally, we must use the summit in Santiago to restate our commitment to the war against international narcotics trafficking and crime. There are hopeful trends. Together, we applaud the steps taken to cut coca production, criminalize money laundering, and permit extradition in the service of justice. Together, we honor the memory of law enforcement and judicial officers struck down by these criminals; and together, we are encouraged by the rise throughout the hemisphere of vigorous civil societies of community leaders, journalists, and just plain citizens demanding that public institutions serve public interests and taking responsibility for making sure they do.

This progress is welcome. But we know that in the struggle between law and outlaw, between democratic integrity and corrupt expediency, we remain in the hottest stages of the battle. We must move ahead together on all fronts and unite in emphasizing to the people throughout the region that, as President Clinton has said, “Drugs are wrong; drugs are illegal; drugs will kill you.”

The United States is looking forward to the Santiago summit, and to achieving an outcome there notable not only for its goals, but for the concrete plans to achieve them. In this connection, the OAS will be vital, for as the embodiment of the inter-American system, the OAS will take the lead in much of what the hemisphere’s leaders decide. As the OAS host country, the United States is committed to its future. We want to work with you to enhance its role as the deliberative and normative forum of this hemisphere. We will do all we can through our Congress to help place the organization on a sound financial footing and to see that its equipment and facilities are adequate and up to date.

Much has changed since April of 1948, when 21 foreign ministers met in Bogota to sign the OAS Charter. Amid the progress and the

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triumphs since have been periods of misunderstanding, incidents of arrogance and tragedy, out of which grew a mistrust between North and South that has not yet fully dissipated. But trust, like mistrust, is the product of deeds not words.

The accomplishments of this organization, the spirit not only of Miami, but of the summits in San Jose and Bridgetown and the promise of Santiago provide a basis for enduring trust. They bring alive the prospect of creating in the new world a truly new world in which our hemispheric community will grow progressively more peaceful, prosperous, and democratic.

Simon Bolivar spoke of freedom and glory. If we are to fulfill that vision, we must each accept not only the privileges of freedom, but

its responsibilities. We must find glory in the degree to which we have made the American promise come real for all our people, rich and poor, of every race, creed, and gender, from the northern most reaches of Alaska to the lighthouse at the end of the world.

Our shared hope is that a half-century from now, when our children and grandchildren look back in their time at our strivings in our time, they will say that we were doers; that we combined compassion with determination; that we loved justice; that we met the test of liberty; and that we bequeathed to them a hemisphere rich in accomplishment and united in building the future. Thank you very much. ■

*Secretary Albright*

# Supporting American Leadership For the 21st Century

February 26, 1998

*Opening statement before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC.*

## **Promoting American Interests And Universal Values**

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the President's Fiscal Year 1999 budget request for the Department of State and related programs.

I want to begin by thanking you for your work last year. One of my highest goals upon becoming Secretary of State was to work with Members of Congress to restore both the spirit and substance of bipartisan support for American leadership around the globe. And as the achievements of this past year reflect, despite some disagreements, we have been moving in the right direction.

Since I last testified before this subcommittee, the United States has helped achieve progress toward a Europe whole and free, a Bosnia where peace is beginning to take hold, an Asia where security cooperation is on the rise, an Africa being transformed by new leaders and fresh thinking, and a Western Hemisphere blessed by an ever-deepening partnership of democracies.

We have also joined the Chemical Weapons Convention as an original member, intensified the war against international crime, taken an essential first step toward a global agreement to combat climate change, and approved the first overall increase in funding for international affairs programs in several years.

More specifically, with your help we have made progress in providing the training, equipment, and resources we need to give the American people the first-class diplomatic representation they deserve. With the additional resources made available last year, we are going forward with a major program of infrastructure repair and are accelerating our modernization of information technology. And I am pleased that, after several years of personnel reductions, we will have as many Foreign

and Civil Service personnel joining us this year as leaving. All this matters, Mr. Chairman, because American leadership is built not only on our military and economic power and on the power of our ideals but also on the effectiveness of our diplomacy.

The accounts funded by this subcommittee determine whether we will have the right people in the right place with the right tools at the right time. And whether we will therefore be able—through our bilateral and multilateral diplomacy effectively—to promote peace, halt the spread of deadly weapons, counter terror, fight international crime, enforce trade agreements, build democracy, raise core labor standards, protect the environment, increase respect for human rights, combat disease, and safeguard the rights of Americans who travel or do business overseas.

I have said that it is America's strategic objective, as we prepare for the new century, to seize the opportunity that history has presented to bring nations closer together around basic principles of democracy, free markets, respect for the law, and a commitment to peace.

America's place in this system is at the center. And our challenge is to keep the connections between regions and among the most prominent nations strong and sure.

We must also help other nations become full partners by lending a hand to those building democracy, emerging from poverty, or recovering from conflict. We must summon the spine to deter, the support to isolate, and the strength to defeat those who run roughshod over the rights of others. And we must aspire not simply to maintain the status quo, for that has never been good enough for America. Abroad, as at home, we must aim for higher standards so that the benefits of growth and the protections of law are shared not only by the lucky few, but by the hardworking many.

## American Leadership Around the World

Before proceeding to a discussion of specific accounts, Mr. Chairman, I would like briefly to review with the subcommittee some of the major foreign policy challenges and initiatives we will face during the coming weeks and months.

Most prominent, of course, is our effort—through diplomacy backed by the threat of force—to see that Iraq complies with its obligations to the world community. That effort is ongoing. On Tuesday, the Security Council was briefed by Secretary General Kofi Annan on Iraq's written agreement to reverse course and grant immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to UN inspectors to sites in Iraq, including those from which they had previously been excluded. We attribute the Iraqi commitments not only to our own firmness, but to the strong international pressure brought to bear on Baghdad by nations from around the world.

In the days ahead, we will be working with the Security Council and UNSCOM to ensure that the agreement is implemented in a manner that reflects the core principles upon which we have insisted: that Security Council resolutions be obeyed, that the integrity of the UN Special Commission—or UNSCOM—be preserved, and that there be no artificial timetables or linkages that would prevent UNSCOM from doing a full and professional job. With our support, UNSCOM will be testing Iraq's commitments thoroughly and comprehensively. As President Clinton said Monday: "Our soldiers, our ships, [and] our planes will stay there in force until we are satisfied Iraq is complying with its commitments."

Although the events of the past few days may have changed the specific circumstances, they have not changed our fundamental goal, which is to contain or end the threat posed by Saddam Hussein to Iraq's neighbors and the world. A solid UN inspection and monitoring regime, backed by sanctions and enforcement of the no-fly and no-drive zones, is our preferred means of achieving that goal. But we retain the authority, the responsibility, the means, and the will to use military force if that is required.

In the meantime, we continue to support expanded efforts through the United Nations oil-for-food mechanism to ease the suffering of the Iraqi people. We do this not as a favor to Saddam, who has often opposed such efforts, but because it is right—and because it deprives Saddam of the argument that Iraqi hardships justify lifting UN sanctions prematurely.

Mr. Chairman, during my visits last week to Tennessee, South Carolina, and—most audibly—Ohio, I heard two somewhat different

but understandable desires voiced by the American people. The first was a strong desire to see the Iraq crisis settled peacefully. Americans have always been reluctant to use force. We do not want to put the lives of innocent people at risk and would never unnecessarily do so.

The second is a desire to see Saddam Hussein removed from power. Unfortunately, we cannot guarantee a peaceful outcome without opening the door to yet another round of Iraqi cheating, which we will not do. Given Saddam's history of aggression, his repeated use of poison gas, and his dishonesty, we cannot safely or responsibly rule out the use of force in the future.

But if we are required to use force, why not go all the way and remove Saddam from power? The answer is that it would require a far greater commitment of military force and a far greater risk to American lives than is currently needed to contain the threat Saddam poses.

Some have suggested that the solution is to arm and encourage the Iraqi opposition to initiate a civil war. That option sounds—but is not—simple. We have worked with Iraqi opponents of Saddam Hussein in the past, and we are ready to work with them more effectively in the future. But the opposition is currently divided, and it would be wrong to create false or unsustainable expectations that could end in bloodshed or defeat.

This leaves us with a policy that is—quite frankly—not fully satisfactory to anyone. It is a "real world" policy, not a "feel good" policy.

But I am convinced it is the best policy to protect our interests and those of our friends and allies in the Gulf. It embodies both our desire for peace and our determination to fight if necessary. It takes into account current realities without—in any way—ruling out future options. It presents the leaders in Baghdad with a clear choice. And it reflects principles that are vital to uphold, not only in the Gulf now, but everywhere, always.

Mr. Chairman, the recent focus on the situation in Iraq should not divert our attention from other important decisions and initiatives we will undertake this year. For America is a global power, and our citizens have important interests in every region on every continent.

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For example, we are working with Europe to meet global challenges such as proliferation, crime, and the environment. And we are working in Europe to realize this century's most elusive dream—a Europe that is whole, free, prosperous, and at peace.

Earlier this week, I joined Defense Secretary Cohen and General Shelton in testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in support of NATO's decision to invite three new European democracies to join the alliance while holding the door open to others.

By adding Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to the alliance, we will expand the area within Europe where wars simply do not happen. And we will enlist in the cause of peace three new allies who are dedicated to NATO principles and ready to contribute to the freedom and security of the continent. I hope, and I believe, that with the support of leaders from both parties and with the encouragement of the American people, the Senate will make the right choice—and allow NATO enlargement to proceed.

Another major test of our commitment to building a united and peaceful Europe is our effort to assist in fulfilling the Dayton accords. Around Christmas, I went to Bosnia with the President and Senator Dole and a number of Members of Congress. We found a nation that remains deeply divided but where multi-ethnic institutions are once again beginning to function. Economic growth is accelerating. Indicted war criminals are being tried. More refugees are returning. And—perhaps most important—a new Bosnian Serb government has been elected that is committed to implementing Dayton.

More slowly than we foresaw, but as surely as we hoped, the infrastructure of Bosnian peace is gaining shape and the psychology of reconciliation is taking hold. But if we turn our backs on Bosnia now, as some urge, the confidence we are building would erode, and the result could well be a return to genocide and war.

Quitting is not the American way. In Bosnia, the mission should determine the timetable, not the other way around. And as the President made clear in December, "that mission must be achievable and tied to concrete benchmarks, not a deadline."

Accordingly, we and our allies have agreed that NATO will continue to lead a multinational force in Bosnia after SFOR's current mandate expires in June. Its mission will continue to be to deter hostilities, support the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, and contribute to establishing a secure environment in which Bosnian authorities can increasingly take charge of their country's stability themselves.

Without expanding SFOR's mandate, we will ensure that the new force has an enhanced capability to deal with the task of ensuring public security. And we will review the size of the force periodically as part of our strategy to gradually transfer its responsibilities to domestic institutions and other international organizations.

We have already held informal briefings with Senators on these consultations. As we discuss with our allies and partners the details of this new phase of operations, you can expect to hear more from us.

We should continue to play an appropriate role in Bosnia as long as our help is needed, our allies and friends do their share, and—most importantly—the Bosnian people are striving to help themselves. That is the right thing to do. And it is the smart thing, for it is the only way to ensure that when our troops do leave Bosnia, they leave for good.

Mr. Chairman, one of our most important foreign policy objectives is to build an inclusive Asia-Pacific community based on stability, shared interests, and the rule of law. To this end, we have fortified our core alliances; crafted new defense guidelines with Japan; maintained our forward deployment of troops; embarked on Four-Party talks to create a basis for lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula; and continued to implement, with our partners, the Agreed Framework, which is dismantling North Korea's dangerous nuclear program.

We have also intensified our dialogue with China, achieving progress on economic and security matters while maintaining our principles on respect for Tibetan heritage and human rights. Let me stress here, Mr. Chairman, that engagement is not the same as endorsement. We continue to have sharp differences with China, but we also believe that the best way to narrow those differences is to encourage China to become a fully responsible participant in the international system.

Steps in the right direction include China's commitment to strictly control nuclear exports, its assurances on nuclear cooperation with Iran, its security cooperation on the Korean Peninsula, its decision to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, its continued economic liberalization, the release of Wei Jingsheng, its invitation to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to visit, and its agreement to pursue cooperative activities with us to strengthen the rule of law—activities that we propose to be partly funded through an increase in the Asia Foundation's budget.

We have also been working with the IMF to respond to the financial crisis in East Asia. Our approach is clear. If a nation affected by instability is to recover, it must reform in a

manner that addresses the underlying problems that created that instability. And if a nation is willing to seriously undertake such reforms, we will help.

East Asia includes some of our closest allies and friends, including South Korea, which faces a large and well-armed military force across the DMZ. The region also includes some of the best customers for U.S. products and services—and if they can't buy, we can't sell. Moreover, since the IMF functions as a sort of intergovernmental credit union, its efforts to assist East Asian economies won't cost U.S. taxpayers a nickel.

Still, there are some who say we should disavow the IMF and abandon our friends, letting the chips—or dominos—fall where they may. It is possible, if we were to do so, that East Asia's financial troubles would not spread and badly hurt our own economy, that our decision to walk away would not be misunderstood, a wave of anti-American sentiment would not be unleashed, and new security threats would not arise in this region where 100,000 American troops are deployed.

All this is possible. But I would not want to bet America's security or the jobs of your constituents on that proposition, for it would be a very, very bad bet.

Even with full backing for the IMF and diligent reforms in East Asia, recovery will take time, and further tremors are possible. The best way to end the crisis is to back the reforms now being implemented, approve the supplemental IMF funding requests submitted by the President earlier this month, work to keep the virus from spreading, and develop strategies for preventing this kind of instability from arising again.

In the Middle East, we continue to guard against another form of instability through our efforts to encourage progress toward a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace. Last month, President Clinton presented ideas to Chairman Arafat and Prime Minister Netanyahu in an effort to break the current stalemate, recognizing that the parties, given the level of their distrust, might respond to us even if they remain reluctant to respond to each other.

The issue now is whether the leaders are prepared to make the kinds of decisions that will make it possible to put the process back on track. Indeed, we have to ask: Are they prepared to promote their common interests as partners? Or are they determined to return to an era of zero-sum relations?

The stakes are high. That's why we have been involved in such an intensive effort to protect the process from collapsing.

Mr. Chairman, closer to home, we meet at a time of heightened emphasis in our policy toward the Americas. This attention is war-

ranted not only by proximity of geography but by proximity of values. For today, with one lonely exception, every government in the hemisphere is freely elected.

In the weeks ahead, we will be preparing for the second Summit of the Americas, pressing for democratic change in Cuba, and intensifying our efforts in Haiti, where the challenge of developing a democratic culture and market economy, where neither has ever existed, is especially daunting.

We are also taking a fresh approach to Africa, which the President plans to visit next month. During my own recent trip, I was impressed by the opportunity that exists to help integrate that continent into the world economy, build democracy, and gain valuable allies in the fight against global threats. To frame a new American approach to the new Africa, we will be seeking congressional support for the President's initiative to promote justice and development in the Great Lakes, and urging approval of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act.

### **Leadership Through International Organizations**

**Unfinished Business.** Mr. Chairman, there is much that America can accomplish unilaterally, through our bilateral diplomacy or in cooperation with our close allies. But in today's world, there are also many problems that can only be dealt with—or can best be dealt with—through broad international action. For this reason, it serves important American interests to participate in international organizations whose activities contribute to our security, prosperity, and safety. Among the most prominent of these organizations are those within the United Nations system.

Last year, Congress and the Administration worked together to develop a three-year plan to encourage United Nations reform while paying our long overdue UN bills. Unfortunately, that spirit of constructive cooperation broke down during the final days of the session. A small group of House Members blocked final passage of this and other key measures to authorize the restructuring of our foreign policy institutions and to provide needed financing for the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

I have testified before the authorizing committees about my concern with the tactics used to block this legislation and will not belabor the point here. Certainly, your subcommittee did its part by appropriating the \$100 million called for in the first year. Now, we have to find a way to free up that money and to gain approval of funds for years two and three.

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Mr. Chairman, I have been discussing the UN and America's role in it with this subcommittee since 1993, and we have had an extremely productive dialogue. Together, through legislation and diplomacy, we have helped the UN to achieve more reform in the past half decade than in the 45 years that preceded it.

During this period, the UN's staffing has declined, and its budget has been brought under control. Assessments for UN peacekeeping operations have dropped by 80%, and those operations are subject to far greater discipline. The Inspector General's office, which did not exist in 1993, has grown steadily more aggressive and effective.

Within the UN system, a new generation of leaders is taking the helm—from Secretary General Kofi Annan to Deputy Secretary General Louise Frechette, to Gro Brundtland at the World Health Organization, to Mary Robinson, the new UN High Commissioner for Human Rights: Slowly, but surely, a culture of accountability, transparency, and results is taking hold. And, as you know, Mr. Chairman, this progress has not come easy. We have faced opposition every step of the way. And the job is far from finished.

But let me tell you, frankly, that if we are not able now—in the next few months—to approve funding for our UN arrears, our legs truly will be cut out from under us at the UN. We are told daily, by our best allies and friends, that U.S. credibility will be sadly diminished. That will cost Americans and hurt America.

Let me cite just one example. Last December, the General Assembly voted on a plan that could have—and I believe would have—cut our share of UN

assessments to 25% for peacekeeping and from 25% to 22% for the regular budget—an overall difference in the amount we are assessed of roughly \$100 million every year.

Our diplomatic team had worked long and hard to make this possible. Don't forget that 22% is less than our share of the world's economy—or GDP—while Europe pays above its share. And in two years, Japan will be required to pay more than 20% of the UN budget.

But when word arrived in New York that the UN arrears package had been killed, support for reducing our rate of assessments

disappeared. It took a heroic effort to persuade the UN to leave open the possibility for a new vote during the first half of this year. If we do not act by then, the next opportunity will not come until the year 2000.

So we have a choice. We can fail once again to act, undermine our own diplomatic leadership, weaken prospects for further UN reform, and deprive our taxpayers of savings we might otherwise be able to achieve. Or we can pay our arrears, restore full U.S. influence, press ahead on reform, and make possible a reduction in our assessments that will save U.S. taxpayers money for as long as we are in the UN.

I know that this choice will not be made by this subcommittee alone. But I ask your support for prompt action—not tied to any unrelated issue—on our supplemental appropriations request for UN arrears. I am convinced it is the right choice for America.

**Contributions to International Organizations.** More broadly, I ask your support for the President's budget request for the entire Contributions to International Organizations Account for fiscal year 1999. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: We have reviewed the importance of these organizations to American interests on an annual basis.

The Clinton Administration, like prior administrations from Truman to Bush, has found the UN, itself, a valuable means of enlisting the help of others in pursuit of goals we support. Current examples include the work of the UN Special Commission in Iraq, the effort to develop an independent and professional police force in Bosnia, and the war crimes tribunals for Rwanda and the Balkans.

Agencies affiliated with the UN also provide vital services.

- The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) helps protect Americans from the dangers of nuclear proliferation. The IAEA conducts essential verification of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its strengthened safeguards regime provides assurance that peaceful nuclear programs are not being diverted for weapons purposes.

- The World Health Organization, which promises to be far better managed under its new director, helps research, track, contain and, above all, prevent disease and other health problems, from malnutrition and malaria to Ebola and HIV/AIDS. This makes us all safer and can provide long-term financial savings, as well. For example, U.S. taxpayers save hundreds of millions of dollars annually because WHO eradicated smallpox and thereby ended the need to vaccinate against the disease.

- The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) enhances international trade in agricultural and fisheries products. Through the *Codex*

*Alimentarius*, it applies objective quality and safety standards that facilitate the export of more than \$60 billion in U.S. agricultural products each year. The FAO also protects U.S. agriculture from potential losses through its plant, pest, and animal disease control programs.

- The International Labor Organization (ILO) was established in 1919 in response to unsafe working conditions associated with industrialization. Although workplace conditions have improved dramatically in much of the world, there remain large, economically significant labor markets characterized by work forces that are underage, underpaid, and poorly treated.

Accordingly, the ILO serves two primary U.S. policy objectives: promoting respect for human rights in the workplace and minimizing unfair international competition from firms and countries that do not observe core labor standards. To this end, we will be working this year for a strong ILO declaration on core labor standards and proposals to implement them worldwide.

Mr. Chairman, other specialized UN agencies and international organizations such as the International Telecommunications Union, NATO, the OECD, and the Organization of American States also serve important U.S. interests. To maintain our influence and leverage within these organizations, we need to stay—or become—current on our obligations to them.

**UN Peacekeeping.** I also ask the subcommittee's support for the President's request for \$231 million for the Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) Account. As we have discussed over the years, UN peacekeeping provides one of a number of options available to us and to the world community to prevent or respond to conflicts. Although they are not the answer in all cases, well-designed UN operations can be effective in the right circumstances and have the advantage of spreading costs and risks widely and fairly.

Our CIPA request this year includes funds to pay our assessments for critical operations along Iraq's border with Kuwait, on the Golan Heights, in Bosnia, and in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—to name a few.

This past year saw several UN successes. The UN observer mission in Liberia helped provide a secure environment for elections in August 1997 and then withdrew. The UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia facilitated that region's peaceful reintegration into Croatia in January. It has now withdrawn, succeeded by a small UN policing program.

And UN peacekeeping operations marked a success in Guatemala, with the implementation of the final peace agreement that was signed in December 1996.

I visited Guatemala last May. At a guerrilla demobilization camp, I saw firsthand how support from the UN, USAID, and others had given the Guatemalan people a chance to recover from the debilitation of war and begin to build a true national community. Although the process of reconciliation in Guatemala still has far to go, the UN operation made a unique and indispensable contribution.

In Tajikistan, where a peace agreement signed last fall is holding tenuously, the UN hopes to make similar progress this year. And in Angola, a UN observer mission is supervising the final phases of that country's peace process.

As always, Mr. Chairman, I am aware of this subcommittee's long-standing and long-justified desire to be consulted when new UN peacekeeping operations are planned—not just when the bills come due. I am committed, and I know Assistant Secretary Lyman and Ambassador Richardson are committed to meeting this obligation. In this connection, I note the possibility that we will support a new operation or operations in Africa. I want to stress, Mr. Chairman, based on my recent visit to that continent and my discussions with regional leaders, how important international peacekeeping has been and is to this part of the world. African leaders are determined to do more themselves to solve disputes within the region, and UN support can help them succeed.

Important U.S. interests in Africa are served every time an area of instability and conflict is transformed into one of peace and development. This contributes to our economic interests, reduces the likelihood of costly humanitarian disasters and refugee flows, and expands the network of societies working to counter global threats such as illegal narcotics, crime, terror, and disease.

## **Managing for the 21st Century**

Mr. Chairman, American leadership is built on American ideals, backed by our economic and military might, and supported by our diplomacy. Unfortunately, despite progress made last year with bipartisan support from this subcommittee, the resources we need to support our diplomacy are stretched thin.

Over the past decade, funding—in real terms—has declined sharply. Personnel levels are down. Training has been cut. And we face critical infrastructure needs that cannot be put off any longer.

*"There was a time, not that long ago, when State Department managers could afford to be guided by a 'just in case' philosophy. Planning, acquisitions, and training could be based on what might be needed. Today, we are compelled by the pace of change and the tightness of budgets to practice 'just in time' management. That requires putting personnel, resources, and infrastructure where they are required when they are required, and being prepared to reposition them rapidly and flexibly when they are not.*

*Already, this has translated into smaller staffs, more versatile personnel, and better cost-sharing among agencies. It has meant selling, buying, renting, and swapping properties around the world to achieve the most cost-effective mix. It has meant developing service programs which pay for themselves. And, through our reorganization planning, it has meant taking a hard look at functions which may be duplicative.*

*But to continue our progress, we need to make some well-placed investments. This year our request for State Department Operating funds is \$2.177 billion. This reflects an increase of 4.8% from Fiscal Year 1998, nearly half of which is attributable to inflation and mandatory pay raises. In addition, we are seeking an increase of \$243 million in our "Security and Maintenance of U.S. Missions" account, to provide much-needed upgrades and improvements in infrastructure.*

*Infrastructure. Like the rest of us, Mr. Chairman, our facilities are aging—old State is 60; new State is 40. Our request this year includes funds for a portion of the long-awaited renovation project at C Street, although the lion's share of money for this project is being requested by the General Services Administration. Just as important, we are requesting funds for some of our most dire infrastructure needs overseas, beginning with two of our most crucial posts—Berlin and Beijing.*

*In 1999, the Germans will complete the move of their capital from Bonn. We need to complete the same move by building a new embassy in the new capital.*

*This move symbolizes the success of 50 years of partnership between the United States and Germany—a partnership cemented with the Berlin airlift 50 years ago this summer and which ultimately helped defeat communism,*

bring down the Wall, and anchor Germany firmly within a strong Euro-Atlantic community. The victory reflected in Berlin's establishment as the capital of a united and democratic Germany is one in which Americans may take great pride and for which we should be on the ground from the beginning.

It is also a tremendous opportunity. Germany possesses the world's third-largest economy, it is host to the largest overseas contingent of U.S. troops, it is the driving force behind European integration, and it is a nation with whom we work closely on matters as diverse as building peace in Bosnia to safeguarding the global economy to exploring space.

Accordingly, Mr. Chairman, we must move now to build our new facility and assure the high-quality representation our interests demand and our people expect. We estimate the total cost of designing, building, and furnishing a new U.S. embassy Berlin to be \$120 million. In fiscal 1999, we are requesting \$50 million—less than half the total cost—because we expect to raise the remaining funds required by selling excess U.S. property in Germany.

Our presence in China is large, growing, and vital to our interests. In recent years, the number of Americans visiting that country as tourists, students, or for business purposes has mushroomed—as has the number of Chinese seeking to enter the United States. And as we have developed a broader agenda on which we seek to cooperate with China, U.S. agencies have sent more officials to our missions in that country. Total staffing increased by 15% last year alone.

Unfortunately, as the Department's Inspector General has confirmed, with the exception of Hong Kong, our posts in China suffer from overcrowding, inadequate facilities, insufficient information technology, substandard housing, and serious safety and security deficiencies.

We have developed an overall plan to address these issues, beginning this year, by building reasonably priced housing in Shanghai and rehabilitating the existing Beijing chancery—both of which can be funded with proceeds from the sale of other properties. We are also requesting \$200 million to acquire a site and design and construct a new embassy for Beijing.

Of course, the problems we face in China are not unique. In critical posts from Luanda to Kiev to Vladivostok, America's representatives are doing their jobs under conditions that are unacceptably primitive, unhealthy, or unsafe. Due to budget restraints, we have requested funding for only a fraction of the needs we have

identified, focusing on improving our safety programs and increasing the number of maintenance specialists we have on staff in order to extend yet further the useful life of the infrastructure we have.

**Information Technology.** Our most pressing information technology needs are basic. We want to install late 20th-century computer technology at every post before the 21st century begins. We need to replace old and overloaded phone switchboards before they experience what is known as “catastrophic failure.” We need to implement new information security features to protect our data and networks. And we want to ensure that, when the clock strikes midnight on December 31, 1999, our computers don’t all crash and send us back to the age of quill pens and scribes.

As communications become ever more sophisticated and ever more reliance is placed on computer hookups, State and our sister agencies need more lines of access, known as “bandwidth,” between Washington and the field.

Unlike your local phone company, we cannot always depend on local lines in foreign countries but must often supplement the communications infrastructure available. And, of course, we must do the work in-house for security reasons. The resulting “phone bill,” Mr. Chairman, is the price we must pay for having the right person on the right phone line when the President or you or I need to get through. I hope you will support us in working to put together a system that is secure, reliable, and capacious enough to meet the demands of the Information Age.

**Personnel.** Mr. Chairman, as Secretary of State, I can tell you that every American can be proud of the people—Foreign and Civil Service and foreign nationals—who work every day, often under very difficult conditions, to protect our citizens and our interests around the world. I have never been associated with a more talented, professional, or dedicated group of people. But to maintain the highest standards of diplomatic representation in this era, we must continue to emphasize high standards in recruiting, training, and managing our personnel.

We need to train our people to sift information as much as to gather it, to surf the web as much as to pound the pavement, and to look outside the traditional “diplomatic sources” for information, contacts, and ideas.

We need specialists who can keep up with fast-moving developments in electronic commerce, genetic engineering, or telecommunications. We need people with good computer skills, with the knowledge to staff our regional

environmental hubs, and with the language and cultural training required to feel at home in faraway lands. And we need men and women who can monitor compliance with intellectual property law, assist Americans in trouble, report on human rights, and promote our arms control agenda, all in the same career—and sometimes in the same week.

And to do justice to the strength our nation finds in its diversity, we have to do better at hiring, retaining, and promoting the best people America has to offer—from every background. We are making progress. I am particularly proud of the large numbers of women competing successfully to enter the Foreign Service this year. But there is much more we can do—from making our overseas facilities more accessible to persons with disabilities to showing more support for State Department families. I hope I can count on this subcommittee as a partner in these efforts.

**Border Security.** Supported by the retention of Machine Readable Visa (MRV) fees, we will continue implementing a comprehensive border security strategy to improve consular systems and services.

Consular systems are our nation’s first line of defense against the flow of international terrorism and crime across our borders. We must be able to screen out the few visa applicants who would harm our people or violate our laws, without hindering the millions of legitimate visitors who enrich our lives and add tens of billions of dollars to our economy every year.

With the MRV, we have the ability to check applicants’ names against government records by computer in every consular post. We are emphasizing improved training for consular officers and are working to provide even better computer equipment. We have also upgraded our passport-issuing services to meet record demand.

I want to thank the subcommittee for having the foresight to continue the legislation allowing the Department to retain MRV fees through Fiscal Year 1999, during which we plan to fund our border security programs at \$296 million.

**Consolidation.** Mr. Chairman, many of our initiatives are directed, as I have discussed, at particular countries or regions. Others, such as our efforts to build prosperity, fight international crime, and protect the environment can best be considered in global terms.

But whether we are dealing with regional or worldwide issues, it is hard to lead in the 1990s with institutions designed for the 1950s. That is why we worked with Congress last year to develop a plan to reorganize our foreign affairs agencies to reflect the fact that arms

control, public diplomacy, and international development belong at the heart of American foreign policy.

As part of this reorganization, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the United States Information Agency (USIA) are to integrate their activities into the Department of State. Unfortunately, legislation providing the necessary authorization for this reorganization was blocked, thus requiring the agencies to present separate budget requests for Fiscal Year 1999.

I hope we will have the subcommittee's support for early action on reorganization legislation this year. This is essential not only to move ahead with our management goals, but to ensure the effective implementation of policies and programs vital to U.S. interests.

For example, it is a core purpose of American foreign policy to halt the spread and possible use of weapons of mass destruction, which remain—years after the Cold War's end—the most serious threat to the security of our people.

This imperative reflects the value of the services provided to America by ACDA. As part of our effort to reorganize our foreign policy institutions, we have “double-hatted” ACDA Director John Holum as our Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, and ACDA has worked closely with the Department to develop an effective plan for integration.

Today, ACDA's agenda includes ratifying and implementing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; continuing strategic arms reductions with Russia; taking steps, with other agencies, to limit the quantity, improve the security, and prevent the diversion of fissile materials worldwide; implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention; negotiating an inspections regime to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention; and beginning negotiations to ban the export of antipersonnel land mines. To accomplish all this, ACDA is requesting \$43.4 million—a total operating budget smaller in constant dollars than that under which it is operating this fiscal year.

USIA has also experienced cuts in staffing and—in constant dollars—appropriations. But the importance of its mission has, if anything, increased, as the challenges of globalization demand a more comprehensive and sophisticated approach to America's public diplomacy. USIA's request for Fiscal Year 1999 is \$6 million lower than its currently available funds. Within this reduced level, USIA plans to accommodate several priority increases to expand field

programs in East Asia, enhance broadcasting to central Africa and Russia, complete a new relay station for Asia, provide added support for Fulbright exchange programs, and provide improved high-speed telecommunications capacity to a dozen additional overseas posts.

This request also includes funding for the National Endowment for Democracy, which receives funding from USIA for its important work supporting the development of democratic culture and institutions around the world.

## Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, half a century ago, a Democratic President and Republican Congress worked together to help forge the institutions that have shaped our foreign policy and defined the history of our age—institutions that proved instrumental in the defense and spread of freedom, the growth of prosperity, the defeat of communism, and the confirmation over and over again of America's standing as a leading force for justice and law in the world. These institutions included NATO, the United Nations, the Voice of America, the OAS, the National Security Council, and the Foreign Service Institute.

Their architects could not have conceived that our ambassadors would one day be cabling Washington by computer in real time; that in promoting trade, our diplomats would be dealing not only with grain and steel but with bits, bytes, and movie rights; or even for that matter, that a female Secretary of State would one day meet with a black President of South Africa.

Our predecessors were not prophets. But because they stood tall, they were perhaps able to see a little bit further into the future than others. They also had faith in our people, in the principles upon which our nation was founded, in our determination to honor the commitments we make, and in our desire to base our lives, as individuals and as a nation, not on our fears but on our hopes.

Today, we have a responsibility to honor their faith, to reject the temptation of complacency and assume, not with complaint, but welcome the leader's role established by our forebears. For it is only by living up to the heritage of our past that we will fulfill the promise of our future—and enter the new century free and respected, prosperous, and at peace.

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee: Thank you very much. ■

*Secretary Albright*

# NATO Enlargement: Advancing America's Strategic Interests

February 24, 1998

*Opening statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC.*

Chairman Helms, Senator Biden, members of the committee: It is my high honor to appear with my colleagues to present the protocols of accession to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 that will add Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO. We view the ratification of these protocols as an essential part of a broader strategy to build an undivided, democratic, and peaceful Europe. We believe this goal is manifestly in America's own interest and that it merits your strong support.

We are approaching the culmination of a remarkable process. It began four years ago when President Clinton and his fellow NATO leaders decided that the question was not whether NATO would welcome new members, but when and how it would do so. It moved forward in Madrid, when, after months of study and deliberation, the alliance agreed that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic would make NATO stronger and met every qualification for membership. It advanced two weeks ago, when President Clinton transmitted to the Congress the documents that will, with your consent, make these three nations America's newest allies.

I want to stress today, Mr. Chairman, that from the start, the Administration's decisions have been shaped by our consultations with you, with this committee and with others, with the NATO Observer Group, and with your colleagues in both Houses of Congress and both parties. Over the last few years, and especially the last few months, you have truly put the "advice" into the process of advice and consent. Our discussions have been a model of the kind of serious, bipartisan conversation we need to be having with the Congress and the American people about our nation's role in the world.

Of course, this is not the first time we have discussed NATO enlargement together. It is also not the first time that we as a nation have considered the addition of new members to our alliance.

Almost 50 years ago, my predecessor, Secretary Dean Acheson, transmitted to President Truman the original North Atlantic Treaty. He pointed out that if NATO was to be

fully effective

it had to be open to

as many countries as are in a position to further the democratic principles upon which the treaty was based, to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area, and . . . to undertake the necessary responsibilities.

In the years since, the Senate has given its consent to the admission of Greece, Turkey, Germany, and Spain into NATO. Each time, the alliance became stronger. Each time, old divisions were overcome; each time, new nations became anchored, once and for all, in the community of democracies that NATO exists to unite and protect. And this time will be no different.

But this moment is historic in another way. For if the Senate agrees, NATO will, for the first time, step across the line it was created to defend and overcome—the line that once so cruelly and arbitrarily divided Europe into east and west.

During the Cold War, I'm sure some of you had the strange experience of seeing that line up close. There were bunkers and barbed wire, mine fields, and soldiers in watchtowers fixing you in their crosshairs. On one side were free people, living in sovereign countries; on the other were people who wanted to be free, living in countries being suffocated by communism.

Go to the center of Europe today, and you would have to use all the powers of your imagination to conjure up these images of that very recent past. There are still borders, of course, but they are there to manage the flow of trucks and tour buses, not to stop troops and tanks. On both sides, people vote and speak and buy and sell freely. Governments cooperate

with one another. Soldiers train and serve together. The legacy of the past is still visible east of the old divide, but in the ways that matter, the new democracies are becoming indistinguishable from their Western neighbors.

We are here today, Mr. Chairman, because the status quo in Europe was shattered by the geopolitical equivalent of an earthquake. That earthquake presented us with a dual challenge: first, how to preserve a favorable security environment into the next century; and second, how to seize the opportunity to build a Europe whole and free.

In meeting that challenge, NATO faced a blunt choice. Would our alliance be the last institution in Europe to continue to treat the Iron Curtain as something meaningful, or would it aid in Europe's reunification and renewal? Would it exclude from its ranks a whole group of qualified democracies simply because they had been subjugated in the past, or would it be open to those free nations that are willing and able to meet the responsibilities of membership and to contribute to our security? I believe NATO made the right choice. NATO's decision to accept qualified new members will make America safer, NATO stronger, and Europe more stable and united.

We recognize, Mr. Chairman, that the decision to build a larger NATO has

implications for our security that must be weighed carefully. It involves solemn commitments; it is not cost-free. It can only be justified if it advances America's strategic interests.

Last October, I had the opportunity to come before you to make the case that a larger NATO will serve our interests. I will try to summarize that case today, and then focus on the questions and concerns that may still exist.

**First**, a larger NATO will make America safer by expanding the area of Europe where wars do not happen. By making it clear that we will fight, if necessary, to defend our new allies, we make it less likely that we will ever be called upon to do so.

Is central Europe in immediate jeopardy today? It is not. But can we safely say that our interest in its security will never be threatened? History and experience do not permit us to say that, Mr. Chairman. There is, after all, the

obvious risk of ethnic conflict. There is the growing danger posed by rogue states with dangerous weapons. There are still questions about the future of Russia. Whatever the future may hold, it is hardly in our interest to have a group of vulnerable and excluded states in the heart of Europe. It will be in our interest to have a vigorous and larger alliance with those European democracies that share our values and our determination to defend them.

A **second** reason is that the very prospect of a larger NATO has given the nations of central and eastern Europe an incentive to solve their own problems. To align themselves with NATO, aspiring allies have strengthened their democratic institutions, improved respect for minority rights, made sure soldiers take orders from civilians, and resolved virtually every old border and ethnic dispute in the region. This is the kind of progress that can ensure outside powers are never again dragged into conflict in this region. This is the kind of progress that will continue if the Senate says yes to a larger NATO.

A **third** reason why enlargement passes the test of national interest is that it will make NATO itself stronger and more cohesive. Our prospective allies are passionately committed to NATO. Experience has taught them to believe in a strong American role in Europe. Their forces have risked their lives alongside ours from the Gulf war to Bosnia. They will add strategic depth to the alliance, not to mention well over 200,000 troops.

Two weeks ago, Foreign Minister Geremek of Poland was in Washington along with his Czech and Hungarian colleagues, and he was asked why his country wants to join NATO. He replied that Poland wants to be anchored at long last in the institutions of the transatlantic community. He said "we owe to America this revival of Poland's attachment to the West . . . Very simply, we owe our freedom to the United States."

Mr. Chairman, let us remember that these countries look forward to assuming the heavy responsibilities of NATO membership not as a burden, but as an opportunity, an opportunity to show the world that they are now mature, capable democracies, ready, willing, and able to give something back to the community of freedom that stood by them in their years of darkness.

This point should be especially important to us today. Our nation is now engaged in an effort to ensure Iraq's compliance with UN Security Council resolutions. We are marshaling the support of other nations in this just cause. When I met with the Foreign Ministers

*"We recognize . . . that the decision to build a larger NATO has implications for our security that must be weighed carefully. It involves solemn commitments; it is not cost-free. It can only be justified if it advances America's strategic interests."*

of our three prospective allies two weeks ago, I asked them to stand by our side. Their response was swift and sure. If we have to take military action, they will be with us.

The bottom line is that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are already behaving as loyal allies. They will be good allies in the future, of that I have no doubt.

Nevertheless, I know that there are still serious critics who have legitimate questions about our policy. We have grappled with many of the same questions ourselves, and I want to address a few of them today.

Some of the concerns revolve around the potential cost of a larger NATO. The last time I was here, Mr. Chairman, we could only talk about estimates, for NATO had not yet come to agreement on this issue. Now, all 16 allies have agreed on the numbers and backed them up with commitments. We know today that the costs will be real, but also that they will be manageable, that they will be met, and that they will be shared fairly.

Some of those costs will be paid by our three new allies. I know some people have argued that these new democracies should not be asked to bear additional military burdens at a time when they are still undergoing difficult economic transformations. But these nations will be modernizing their armed forces in any case, and they have told us that in the long run it will be cheaper to do so within NATO than outside it.

Ultimately, only the people of these countries can decide what is best for their future. Today, in all three, solid public majorities and every mainstream party support membership in NATO. All three have growing economies. All three are building stronger, leaner, more professional armed forces. They are telling us they see no contradiction between security and prosperity, and we should not substitute our judgment for theirs.

There are also people who worry that the cost of a larger NATO—to us and to our allies—will be far greater than the alliance has projected. That fear is partly based on a natural belief that governments tend to underestimate costs, sometimes severely, sometimes on purpose. But that is not the case with NATO. Our contributions to NATO are a budgeted line item, not an open-ended entitlement. They are funded in an annual exercise that will be fully in your own control. There is no history of running NATO on supplemental appropriations.

That fear is also partly based on an assumption that we will someday have to respond to a military threat to our new allies. If we are called upon to send troops to defend our

new allies, then the cost will surely grow. But then, if such a dire threat were to arise, the cost of our entire defense budget would grow, whether we enlarge NATO or not. If you believe, as I do, that we have a security interest in the fate of these countries, then the most effective—and cost-effective—way to protect that interest is to make them allies now. As President Havel of the Czech Republic has rightly said: “Even the costliest preventive security is cheaper than the cheapest war.”

Another concern that I want to address today is that adding new members to NATO could diminish the effectiveness of the alliance and make it harder to reach decisions—in short, that it could dilute NATO. But we have pursued NATO enlargement in a way that will make the alliance stronger, not weaker.

This is why we have insisted that any nation wishing to join NATO must meet the strict conditions that former Secretary of Defense Perry enunciated in 1995: They must be market democracies with civilian control of the military, good relations with neighbors, and the ability to contribute to NATO’s mission of collective defense. This is why when President Clinton went to the Madrid summit last July, he insisted that only the strongest candidates be invited to join in this first round. As you know, the President was under some pressure, both at home and abroad, to agree to four or five new allies. He agreed to three, because we are determined to preserve NATO’s integrity and strength.

Ultimately, what matters is NATO’s effectiveness in action. We need to be confident that our allies have the resolve to stand with us when the going gets tough. So let us remember: When we asked Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to join us in the Gulf, they did not hesitate. When we asked them to put their soldiers in harm’s way in Bosnia, they did not hesitate. When we asked Hungary to open its bases to American troops so they could deploy safely to Bosnia, it did not hesitate.

NATO is a military alliance, not a social club. But neither is it an inbred aristocracy. We must be prudent enough to add members selectively, but we must be smart enough to add those members that will add to our own security. These three will. Others may in the future. And that in turn, raises another question I know a number of Senators have; namely, where will this process lead us and what about those countries that are not now being invited to join?

Part of the answer lies in NATO’s Partnership for Peace and in its new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. Through these arrangements, virtually every nation from Armenia to

Finland can act side by side with NATO and help to shape the exercises and missions we undertake with them. But an equally important part of the answer lies in NATO's commitment to keep its door open to additional members. This is central to the logic of a larger NATO. After all, we set out on this policy because we believe that NATO cannot respect and must not perpetuate arbitrary lines of division in Europe. We gain nothing by ruling out a country as a future ally if it is important to our security, and if it proves that it is willing and able to contribute to our security.

*“Some now propose that we freeze the process of enlargement for some arbitrary number of years. Some of these people have said, with candor, that their real aim is to freeze the process forever. Let me be absolutely clear: This Administration opposes any effort in the Senate to mandate an artificial pause in the process of NATO enlargement.”*

Let me say very clearly that we have made no decisions about who the next members of NATO should be or when they might join. But we should also have some humility before the future.

How many people predicted in 1949 that Germany would so soon be a member of the alliance? Who could have known in 1988 that in just 10 years, members of the old Warsaw Pact would be in a position to join NATO? Who can tell today what Europe will look like in even a few years? This is just one reason why we want to preserve our flexibility—and that of those who will lead the alliance in years to come.

Some now propose that we freeze the

process of enlargement for some arbitrary number of years. Some of these people have said, with candor, that their real aim is to freeze the process forever. Let me be absolutely clear: This Administration opposes any effort in the Senate to mandate an artificial pause in the process of NATO enlargement.

Last July, Mr. Chairman, President Clinton and I had the amazing experience of traveling the length and breadth of central and eastern Europe. In those countries that were not invited to join NATO, we were met by enthusiastic crowds and by leaders who support the decisions the alliance made in

Madrid. They know they have a ways to go before they can be considered. Yet just the possibility of joining has inspired them to accelerate reform, to reach out to their neighbors, and to reject the destructive nationalism of their region's past.

A mandated pause would be heard from Tallinn in the north to Sofia in the south as the sound of an open door slamming shut. It would be seen as a vote of no-confidence in reform-minded governments from the Baltics to the Balkans. It would be taken as a sign that we have written these countries off and diminish the incentive they have to cooperate with their neighbors and with NATO. It would fracture the consensus NATO itself has reached on its open door. It would be at once dangerous and utterly unnecessary, since the Senate would in any case have to approve the admission of any new allies. It would defeat the very purpose of NATO enlargement.

Mr. Chairman, let me take a few moments to discuss one final key concern: the impact of a larger NATO on Russia and on our ties with that country. I want to stress that this concern has to do mostly with perceptions, not reality. And while perceptions can be important, our policies must follow from what we know to be true.

For example, there is a common perception that we are moving NATO, its tanks and bombers, and even its nuclear weapons right up to Russia's borders, and that therefore Russia has a reason to be threatened by a larger NATO. The reality is quite different.

Proximity is not the issue. Russia and NATO have shared a common border since 1949—both Russia and Norway know this is nothing new. There are no tensions along the border between Poland and the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad on the Baltic Sea coast. Hungary and the Czech Republic, meanwhile, are closer to France than they are to the nearest corner of Russian soil.

As for weaponry, NATO has announced that in the current and foreseeable security environment, it has no plan, no need, and no intention to station nuclear weapons in the new member countries, nor does it contemplate permanently stationing substantial combat forces. Just as important, the prospect of joining NATO has given our future allies the confidence to avoid arms buildups and to work constructively to establish lower limits on conventional forces. Their ties with Russia are more normal and cooperative today than at any time in history.

If we did not enlarge NATO, exactly the opposite could happen. The central European nations would feel isolated and insecure. They would undoubtedly spend more on defense, and they might reject regional arms control. As Senator Biden has pointed out, they would

probably create their own mutual security arrangements, which might well be anti-Russian in character. Ironically, the problems Russia fears a larger NATO will cause are precisely the problems a larger NATO will avoid.

A more worrisome perception is that Russian opposition to expansion, whether justified or not, is hurting our relationship with Moscow. But once again, the reality is different.

I have spent much time during the last year talking with my Russian counterpart, Foreign Minister Primakov and other Russian leaders. I can assure you that the issue of enlargement is not a cloud that shadows these discussions. I believe our relationship is developing according to its own rhythms and priorities, and we have made significant progress in a number of key areas.

The new NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council is up and running. Russia is taking part in the Partnership for Peace. Our soldiers and diplomats are working together in Bosnia. Russia was a full participant at the Summit of the Eight in Denver last year, and we are helping it prepare for membership in the World Trade Organization. With our support, Russia has continued on the path of economic and democratic reform.

We are pushing ahead with arms control as well: Russia is a year ahead of schedule in slicing apart nuclear weapons under the START I Treaty. We signed a START II protocol that helps clear the way for the next phase in strategic arms reductions and, we hope, will expedite Russian ratification of that treaty. Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin have agreed on the outlines of a START III treaty that would cut strategic arsenals to 80% below their Cold War peaks, once START II enters into force. Russia has joined us in banning nuclear testing and it has followed us in ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention. We have begun to adapt the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.

We are also working with Russia to improve the security of nuclear weapons and materials, making good use of the programs pioneered in the Nunn-Lugar legislation. We are helping Russia stop production of weapons-grade plutonium. As we speak, our experts are helping to build safe and secure storage facilities for tons of fissile material, and to upgrade security at nuclear weapons storage sites throughout Russia.

I am not here to pretend that everything is perfect in our relationship with Russia. We are frankly concerned about the slow pace of action on START II ratification. We have serious concerns about Russia's relationship with Iran. Our perspectives on Iraq differ as well, though

we fully agree on the fundamental goal of full Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions. But let us be clear: It is a big mistake to think that every time Russia does something we do not like, it is to "punish" us for bringing Hungary or Poland into NATO.

Our disagreements with Russia, especially about the Middle East and Gulf, have come about because of the manner in which Russia is defining its national interests in that part of the world. These differences existed long before NATO decided to expand. If the Senate were to reject enlargement, we would not make them go away. We would, however, be turning our backs on three nations that have stood with us on Iraq, on Iran, and on the range of security issues that matter to America.

Mr. Chairman, I think there is a larger issue at stake here. Those critics who focus on Russia's opposition to enlargement are making an assumption that Russia will always define its national interests in ways inimical to our own. These voices assume Russia will always be threatened and humiliated by the desire of its former satellites to go their own way; that it will never get over the end of its empire. They say that we should be realistic and accept this. They would have us ask Russia's neighbors to set aside their legitimate aspirations indefinitely for the sake of U.S.-Russian cooperation.

I believe those assumptions sell Russia short. I believe they ignore the progress we have made and that Russia has made in coming to terms with a world that has radically changed.

I am confident America can build a true partnership with a new Russia. But the partnership we seek cannot be purchased by denying a dozen European countries the right to seek membership in NATO. A partnership built on an illegitimate moral compromise would not be genuine, and it would not last.

I am also confident that Russia can succeed in its effort to become a prosperous, stable democracy—that it is becoming a normal power that expresses its greatness by working with others to shape a more just and lawful world. That transformation will only be delayed if we give Russia any reason to believe that it can still assert its greatness at the expense of its neighbors in central Europe. It is much more likely to advance as Russia recognizes that the same rules apply to every part of Europe; that Poland is no different from Portugal in its right to pursue its own aspirations.

Mr. Chairman, for all these reasons and more, I believe that the choice before you involves much, much more than the immediate future of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. It involves the future security of the

United States; the future of an undivided Europe; the future of Russia and the character of our relationship with it. In a sense, it involves the most basic question of all in our foreign policy: How do we avoid war and maintain a principled peace?

For some people, the answer seems to revolve around catch phrases such as globalization and the naive hope that people who trade and exchange e-mails won't fight. But I do not believe we can bet our future on such an assumption. This is still a dangerous world.

We need to remain vigilant and strong—militarily and economically. We must strive to maintain the cordial relations among major powers which has lent brightness to the promise of our age. At the same time, we cannot assume that great power diplomacy alone will achieve the peaceful conditions in the future that it has so often failed to achieve in the past.

That is why we must also strengthen the proven alliances and institutions that provide order and security based on realism and law, for nations large and small—institutions that

deter aggression and that give us a means to marshal support against it when deterrence fails.

That is what NATO does. That is why we decided to keep it after the Cold War ended. That is why we decided to expand it. That is why I thank you today, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, for working with us to make this day possible.

I commend you and the committee for the time and effort you have dedicated to this vital decision. The NATO enlargement debate has not always been in the limelight. It is not about responding to the crisis of the moment; it is about the less glamorous, less headline-grabbing business of preventing the crises of the future. It calls for serious attention to be paid to the long-term challenges facing our country. And that is what you have done, with an emphasis on patriotism, not partisanship.

I thank you for helping to make this committee, and the Senate as a whole, our full partner in the creation of a larger, stronger, better NATO. I look forward to your questions today and in the days to come. ■

*David J. Scheffer*

# The Clear and Present Danger Of War Crimes

February 24, 1998

*Address by the U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes at the University  
of Oklahoma College of Law, Norman, Oklahoma.*

Thank you, Dean Coates. I am extremely grateful for this opportunity to address such a distinguished audience of Oklahomans in my hometown—Norman. I grew up only a few blocks from here, on Elmwood Drive. Wherever I have gone in the world, I have always been most proud to say that I was born and raised in the heartland of America—Oklahoma. And I remind all that in my hometown on the plains the only hill is one that was built by the U.S. Navy during World War II for target practice. That hill still stands next to Interstate 35 on old North Base. I used to climb it as a kid picking up shell cartridges. I would like to remember that battered old hill as this town's monument to the men and women who have given their lives defending this country and the freedom and dignity of millions around the world. Someone ought to put an American flag on top of it—permanently.

The University of Oklahoma is the pride of this State and, under the leadership of President David Boren, is strengthening its international standing. I am fortunate that my entire family has deep roots in this institution. My father, Regents' Professor Emeritus Walter Scheffer, taught his entire career here and pioneered the Graduate Program in Public Administration, which stretches across the globe. My mother received her B.A. and M.A. degrees in English literature here. Dad and Mom both have scholarships in their names now at OU. My three sisters received all of their degrees from OU and are professional women of the highest integrity. We know the heritage of this great university and have always believed in its potential.

We live in a world today where threats to our security and to the security of other countries are growing in their number, their complexity, and their elusiveness. The threats include international terrorism and drug trafficking, the development and deployment of weapons of mass destruction, man-made

ecological transformations, and global economic gyrations which are placing whole societies at risk. Our foreign diplomatic, military, and economic policies must confront these threats, and this is a challenge that the Clinton Administration is determined to meet.

But I have come to Norman today to speak about another clear and present danger to civilized people around the world. It is a danger that would be ignored at our peril. Crimes against humanity and war crimes are all too frequent in modern conflict and internal power struggles. Genocide has occurred in Cambodia, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia, and perhaps other places as well. The absence of justice is too often the norm rather than the exception in lands where armed conflicts and atrocities proliferate. Combatants are as likely to know as much about the laws of war as they do about quantum mechanics.

Typical among the victims are women and children—often in the thousands—raped and mached for their mere existence. The severity of mass killings in our own time, on the eve of the millennium, reflects how little we know of ourselves, of our neighbors, and of our future. Neither our faith in the impressive march of technology nor our other aspirations of the next century can overshadow the grotesque reality of the massacres that characterize civilization, or the lack thereof, in today's troubled world.

But America has tried to lead the way since the Civil War to codify international rules to govern armed conflict and to outlaw the slaughter of civilians. Our soldiers fought to defend those principles in two world wars and throughout the Cold War, and they stand prepared to sustain those principles today.

Our principles are at stake today when we look at the track record of the present Iraqi dictatorship. U.S. military forces are deployed in the Persian Gulf because the record of Saddam Hussein and of his regime leaves us with no choice but to do whatever is required to

ensure that Iraq complies fully with the UN Security Council resolutions whose fulfillment is essential to restoring peace and security to that important part of the world. The recent crisis has centered on Iraq's continued resistance to eliminating all of its weapons of mass destruction and the means to produce them.

The United States and our many allies in this effort have stood firm in backing up our diplomacy with the threat of force to persuade Saddam Hussein that the international community will not permit him to use such weapons again, as he has in the past against his neighbors and even against his own people. We are examining closely the agreement reached by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan with Saddam Hussein on February 23rd to determine future action. President Clinton said yesterday that,

what really matters is Iraq's compliance, not its stated commitments; not what Iraq says, but what it does. In the days and weeks ahead, UNSCOM must test and verify . . . if Iraq fails to comply this time to provide immediate, unrestricted, unconditional access to the weapons inspectors, there will be serious consequences.

What must never be forgotten is the legacy of what Saddam Hussein has done against his neighbors and against his own people. What must we remember of the life and times of Saddam Hussein and of his military regime? Saddam Hussein seized power in 1979. In the 1980s he used poison gas against Iran during the Iran-Iraq war. In 1988, his forces committed crimes against humanity and, perhaps even genocide during the "Anfal" campaign against the Iraqi Kurds, including the use of poison gas, which killed thousands of innocent civilians in the town of Halabja alone. During the Gulf war, Saddam's regime committed crimes against humanity and war crimes against the people of Kuwait, taking many civilians as prisoners and torturing many to death. Iraq has never answered Kuwait's anguished demands for a full accounting of Kuwaiti prisoners of war and missing civilians, which is yet another breach of Iraq's obligations under Security Council Resolution 687—yet another confirmation of the reality of Saddam's regime.

The Iraqi regime committed war crimes against coalition forces during the Gulf war, including violations of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War. During the Gulf war, Saddam deployed "human shields" to military targets, blatantly violating the Geneva Convention on Protection of Civilians. He used human shields last November and has threatened to commit the same war crime once again in the event our forces have to bomb military targets. Saddam has waged crimes against humanity against Marsh Arabs of southern Iraq and against Iraqi Kurds in northern Iraq since 1991.

Tens of thousands of civilians have perished. And this is not an exhaustive list. Saddam Hussein is, as Secretary Albright reminded us last week, a "repeat offender." He is the nightmare the Iraqi people have suffered since 1979. Anyone who believes otherwise or blames the international community for conditions within Iraq suffers from acute amnesia. Saddam must not be appeased, and his crimes must never be forgotten. U.S. policy reflects, and will continue to reflect, these realities.

Though our attention is focused on Iraq at the moment, the clear and present danger of war crimes reaches beyond the regime in Baghdad. The atrocities wrought by war criminals undermine the rule of law, create chaos within societies, generate massive refugee flows, fuel wars, cost governments billions of dollars to overcome, and challenge the moral underpinnings of civilization itself. You may witness the danger only on television, but the United States is on the front line every day confronting these assaults on humanity.

In the Balkans and in Rwanda, the perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes are the targets of an international prosecutor, Justice Louise Arbour, who is succeeding, one indictee at a time, to resurrect the legacy of Nuremberg in our time. The number of indictees of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in custody has more than tripled in the last year. Twenty-two of the 76 indicted who remain living are now in custody. Many have surrendered voluntarily; others have been arrested with the active support of the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR), acting within its mandate.

The United States has led the effort to bring indictees to The Hague, and will continue to do so. The fact that certain major indictees remain at large should lead no one to assume that we are satisfied. Those indictees who are still at large, including Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, must realize that their day before the Yugoslav Tribunal will come; that there are no deals to cut; that there is no way they can avoid a fair trial. It is important to note that the new Prime Minister of Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik, who took office last month, has now said that all war criminals should go to The Hague voluntarily or otherwise. Prime Minister Dodik promised to work intensively to facilitate voluntary surrenders, but he acknowledged that, under any circumstances, all those indicted must face justice. Karadzic and Mladic should take the hint and surrender now.

At the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha, Tanzania, 23 of 32 indictees are now in custody. Some of the major leaders of the 1994 genocide are among those in custody. More of the ringleaders will be

indicted in the future, and we will provide every possible support in their apprehension and prosecution.

The Clinton Administration is determined that the international tribunals will be fully supported until their jobs are done. Two months ago the UN General Assembly approved, for the first time, full budget requests for the tribunals, each reflecting more than a 30% increase over their 1997 budgets. That is an extraordinary development given the budgetary situation at the United Nations—and one that we are pleased to see.

This leads me to a related point. At the very moment in world history when the United States can make the critical difference in waging peace—by joining with others to enforce international law, advancing vital national security interests, and bringing war criminals to justice—our credibility and our influence with other governments is needlessly and foolishly at risk.

The failure of the United States to pay its UN debts for years has had severe repercussions in the exercise of American foreign policy. As Secretary Albright has said, we are the indispensable nation, but we cannot go it alone. We were pleased last year to receive bipartisan support for legislation that would put us well on the way to satisfying our obligations at the United Nations. Unfortunately, final passage of this bill was blocked by a small group of House members who wanted to hold the legislation hostage over an unrelated issue. The American people must not let this happen again. The United States has a responsibility to pay our debts at the same time as we insist that reform at the United Nations goes forward. The pursuit of war criminals is only one reason to pay our fair share, but even standing alone it is a darn good reason. Historians will judge us not only for the good we have done, but for the good we have failed to do. We must not fail to bring to justice the genocidaires and war criminals of our era.

There is at this moment a yawning gap between the judicial chambers of the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals and those areas of the world where justice remains denied. There are no international mechanisms for holding individuals criminally accountable for the violations of international humanitarian law that have occurred in Burundi, in Cambodia, in Iraq, and elsewhere. I know the challenge this presents and how difficult it will be to advance the rule of law. But we have a responsibility to try in the years ahead.

One area of obvious interest in this regard is Iraq. Finding a way to hold Saddam Hussein and his regime accountable for their crimes is an issue that the Clinton Administration has

long had in mind. We will remain vigilant in that objective and continue to examine with other key governments the best way forward. We have not lost sight of the possibility of supporting another government's action against the Government of Iraq on charges of genocide in the International Court of Justice. We have acknowledged the important goals of the INDICT campaign that non-governmental organizations and the Iraqi opposition have launched. We were heartened by House Concurrent Resolution 137 on November 17 which called, by a vote of 396-2, for an international war crimes tribunal to prosecute Saddam Hussein.

Looking beyond Iraq, President Clinton is determined to see established, by the end of this century, a permanent international criminal court that will bring to justice future perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Since 1995, the United States has joined with other governments at the United Nations in talks on how to structure and establish such a permanent court. We are now in the final stages. Our last Preparatory Committee meeting convenes next month in New York. In June and July, a UN diplomatic conference will be held in Rome to negotiate a treaty. If the United States signs the treaty, it will ultimately have to be considered by the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

As head of the U.S. delegation negotiating the establishment of a permanent court, I am keenly aware of the objectives we must achieve and the national interests we must protect in creating such a court. I want to share some of them with you today.

The rule of law, which the United States has always championed, is at risk again of being trampled by war criminals whose only allegiance is to their own pursuit of power. We believe that a core purpose of an international criminal court must be to impose a discipline of law enforcement upon national governments themselves to investigate and prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, failing which the permanent court will stand prepared to undertake that responsibility. Just as the rule of extradition treaties is "prosecute or extradite," the rule governing the international criminal court must be "prosecute nationally or risk international prosecution."

*" . . . President Clinton is determined to see established, by the end of this century, a permanent international criminal court that will bring to justice future perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes."*

That discipline on national systems to fulfill their obligations under international humanitarian law has been and will continue to be central to the U.S. position in the negotiations. Our long-term vision is the prevention of these crimes through effective national law enforcement joined with the deterrence of an international criminal court.

Second, the authority of the UN Security Council under the UN Charter to restore and maintain international peace and security and to repel aggression must be fully preserved. The Security Council should play a significant role in certain procedures of the permanent court so that the dual objectives of peace and justice can be pursued most effectively. The court will need to look to the Security Council for referrals of armed conflicts or atrocities where the mandatory cooperation of states is required to hold perpetrators of crimes accountable. The court also will need to rely upon the Security Council for certain enforcement actions to ensure compliance with the orders of the court.

Third, the U.S. criminal and military justice systems are the most sophisticated and highly developed in the world. Our courts must have the primary duty of investigation and prosecution of U.S. citizens, who must not be subjected to any unwarranted, unjustified, or frivolous exposure to the jurisdiction of the permanent court.

Fourth, no other country shoulders the burden of international security as does the United States. In the post-Cold War world, the U.S. military is called upon to defend our national security from a wide range of threats; to carry out mandates from the Security Council; to fulfill our commitments to NATO; to help defend our allies and friends; to achieve humanitarian objectives, including the protection of human rights; to combat international terrorism; to rescue Americans and others in danger; and to prevent the proliferation or use of weapons of mass destruction. Many other governments participate in our military alliances, and a larger number of governments participate in UN and other multinational peacekeeping operations, such as SFOR in

Bosnia. It is in our collective interests that the personnel of our militaries and civilian commands be able to fulfill their many legitimate responsibilities without unjustified exposure to criminal legal proceedings. The permanent court must not be manipulated for political purposes to handcuff governments taking risks to promote international peace and security and to save human lives. Otherwise, the permanent court would undermine the effort to confront genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.

We believe such a court can be structured, but much hard work lies ahead on the road to Rome. The world desperately needs a permanent international criminal court that is fair, effective, and efficiently administered. And it will need the United States as its strongest pillar of support. We look forward to working closely with other governments and with non-governmental organizations in the months ahead to forge a permanent court.

In December, Secretary Albright directed me to investigate the site of a massacre of Tutsis in northwest Rwanda shortly after an attack by Hutu insurgents which left hundreds dead and hundreds more wounded. After touring the devastation of the Mudende refugee camp where the slaughter took place and seeing the mass graves, I visited Gisenyi Hospital where I saw the living horror of resurgent genocide in the anguished faces of 267 victims. The wounded were overwhelmingly women and children. Many had multiple wounds caused by gunshot, machete, and burns. The lone exhausted surgeon in the hospital told me how he literally stuffed the brains of children back into their skulls and stitched up the consequences of malicious machete attacks. I saw bloated heads that bore out the surgeon's efforts at triage. Women and babies with untreated compound fractures moaned in agony. One young beautiful girl lay paralyzed by a gunshot wound to her lower spine. There was a critical shortage of medical supplies and medical personnel.

We all have a duty to respond to this barbarity; indeed, to this clear and present danger. Thank you. ■

## MULTILATERAL

### Children

Convention on the protection of children and cooperation in respect of intercountry adoption. Done at The Hague May 29, 1993. Entered into force May 1, 1995.<sup>1</sup>

*Signatures:* Belarus, Dec. 10, 1997; Germany, Nov. 7, 1997.

### Judicial

Convention on the service abroad of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil and commercial matters. Opened for signature at The Hague Nov. 15, 1965. Entered into force Feb. 10, 1969.

*Accession:* Belarus, June 6, 1997.

Convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction. Done at The Hague Oct. 25, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 1, 1983; for the U.S. July 1, 1988.

*Signature:* Turkey, Jan. 21, 1998.<sup>2</sup>

### Pollution

1996 amendments to the Annex of the Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973. Adopted at London July 10, 1996. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1998.

### Terrorism

Convention on the safety of the United Nations and associated personnel. Done at New York Dec. 9, 1994.<sup>3</sup>

*Accessions:* Chile, Aug. 27, 1997; Korea, Dec. 8, 1997.

*Ratifications:* Czech Republic, June 13, 1997; Korea, Dec. 8, 1997; Philippines, June 17, 1997; Romania, Dec. 29, 1997; Spain, Jan. 13, 1998.

## BILATERAL

### Denmark

Acquisition and cross-servicing agreement, with annexes. Signed at Vedbaek, Denmark and Patch Barracks, Germany Jan. 5 and 8, 1998. Entered into force Jan. 8, 1998.

### European Organization for Nuclear Research

Agreement concerning scientific and technical cooperation on Large Hadron Collider activities. Signed at Washington Dec. 8, 1997. Entered into force Dec. 8, 1997.

Accelerator protocol relating to the agreement of Dec. 8, 1997, concerning scientific and technical cooperation on Large Hadron Collider activities. Signed at Geneva Dec. 19, 1997. Entered into force Dec. 19, 1997.

Experiments protocol relating to the agreement of Dec. 8, 1997, concerning scientific and technical cooperation on Large Hadron Collider activities. Signed at Geneva Dec. 19, 1997. Entered into force Dec. 19, 1997.

### Hungary

Agreement extending the annex to the air transport agreement of July 12, 1989, as amended (TIAS 11260). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 8 and July 11, 1997. Entered into force July 11, 1998.

### Iceland

Agreement relating to the loan of aviation-related equipment. Signed at Washington Dec. 8, 1997. Entered into force Dec. 8, 1997.

### Israel

Agreement amending the memorandum of agreement of July 12 and 18, 1996, as amended, concerning the Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD). Signed at Tel Aviv Dec. 3 and 12, 1997. Entered into force Dec. 12, 1997.

Agreement amending the memorandum of understanding of Dec. 14, 1987, concerning the principles governing mutual cooperation in research and development, scientist and engineer exchange, procurement and logistic support of defense equipment. Signed at Washington and Tel Aviv Dec. 19, 1997 and Jan. 8, 1998. Entered into force Jan. 8, 1998; effective Dec. 14, 1997.

### Latvia

Agreement concerning security measures for the protection of classified military information. Signed at Washington Jan. 15, 1998. Entered into force Jan. 15, 1998.

### Pakistan

Investment incentive agreement. Signed at Islamabad Nov. 18, 1997. Entered into force Jan. 28, 1998.

**Poland**

Memorandum of agreement concerning assistance in developing and modernizing Poland's civil aviation infrastructure. Signed at Washington and Warsaw Jan. 5 and 14, 1998. Entered into force Jan. 14, 1998.

**Portugal**

Acquisition and cross-servicing agreement, with annexes. Signed at Lisbon Jan. 14, 1998. Entered into force Jan. 14, 1998.

**Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic**

Acquisition and cross-servicing agreement concerning mutual logistic support. Signed at Tel Aviv Dec. 17 and 18, 1997. Entered into force Dec. 18, 1997.

**Suriname**

Agreement for cooperation in the Global Learning and Observations to Benefit the Environment (GLOBE). Signed at Paramaribo Dec. 23, 1997. Entered into force Dec. 23, 1997.

**Tanzania**

Investment incentive agreement. Signed at Dar es Salaam Dec. 24, 1996. Entered into force Nov. 26, 1997.

**Ukraine**

Agreement extending the protocol of May 10, 1995 to the air transport agreement of 1990, as extended. Effected by exchange of notes at Kiev Jan. 6 and 14, 1998. Entered into force Jan. 14, 1998.

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<sup>1</sup> Not in force for the U.S.

<sup>2</sup> With reservation(s).

<sup>3</sup> Not in force. ■

